Can Japan's ailing banking system be cured? by unknown

































Center on Japanese Economy and Business
Columbia Business School
All photos © Ken Levinson
3Can Japan’s Ailing 
Banking System Be Cured?
May 2, 2002
APAN’S NON-PERFORMING LOAN problem is not going away.
Despite efforts to clean up the mess, the Japanese government estimates
that banks are still mired in ¥43 trillion in problem loans, and private ana-
lysts say the actual figure may be much higher. While Prime Minister
Koizumi has said he will stick to his plan to promote the disposal of banks’
bad debt over the next three years, he faces stiff resistance to restructuring from
factions within his own party.With Japan’s economy still seriously hobbled, many
worry that the cure could be worse than the disease, with bank restructuring
sparking more corporate bankruptcies and higher unemployment. On the other
side of the coin, major questions remain over how to restore corporate Japan
back to health.
Still, analysts see some signs of positive change in Japan’s banking system.They
point to tougher regulatory oversight by the FSA, the recent spate of bank
acquisitions by American funds like Ripplewood and WL Ross, and consolidation
within the industry. But while these may be steps in the right direction, analysts
say much more will have to be done to address the problem of non-performing
loans if Japan is to avert a full-blown banking crisis.
Can Japan’s ailing banks be cured? How will loan workouts and corporate
restructuring proceed? This half-day conference tried to answer those questions
by bringing senior Japanese and American politicians, policymakers, bank execu-
tives and analysts together to discuss the prospects for reform within Japan’s
banking system and the continuing efforts to tackle the bad loan problem amid
worsening economic conditions at home and abroad.
The conference was organized by Japan Society, New York and the Center on




























AN JAPAN’S AILING BANKING SYSTEM be cured? To speak about it is obviously a
daunting task not just for me but also for any policymakers in Japan. Japan’s economy appears to
have entered a short cyclical recovery driven by progress in inventory adjustment worldwide.
Surprisingly enough, optimism about the Japanese economy is growing again within the govern-
ment after equity prices rebounded from the February low. Japan’s economy has experienced
three short-term recessions during the past decade.A financial crisis repeatedly emerged during each reces-
sion period. Each recession was followed by a short and weak recovery mainly supported by inventory build
up in the manufacturing sector. Overall, Japanese GDP has declined throughout the decade. Seventy-five per-
cent of GDP consists of the known manufacturing sector in which huge non-performing loans concentrate.
The fading sense of emergency on the part of the government indicates that a serious deficiency lies in the
national government system.
A caveat must be placed against the optimism which is the exact same phrase I used in my speech in Washing-
ton, D.C., in 1999 when the Japanese economy was about to enter a cyclical recovery for the second time.
Now I have the same diagnosis and the same prescription.
I have to warn again by quoting a Japanese old saying;
Hotoke-no-kao-mo-sando-made (Buddha condones no more
than three times). Maladies of the banking systems are
quite apparent.We should always start with the recogni-
tion of the grave magnitude of non-performing assets.
One year ago Prime Minister Koizumi announced that his
administration would concentrate on the disposal of
non-performing assets. However, the reality was to set
slightly more than ¥12.2 trillion in bad loans off the bal-
ance sheets of the banks within the next two to three
years.The Financial Services Agency (FSA) disclosed the
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government system.”
outcome of the special inspection of major banks
on April 12th. This inspection covered 149 large,
heavily indebted companies, the result of which
reported also as only as little as ¥3 to 4 trillion to
the narrowly defined disposition target of bad
loans. I hope this initial inspection will be the first
step in disposing non-performing loans accumulat-
ed on the balance sheets of the banks.
We must bear in mind that more than ¥80 trillion
of so-called “category two loans” or substandard
loans on a self-assessment basis, which is the equiv-
alent of 16 percent of GDP, remain concentrated
on real estate, general construction, retail, whole-
sale and non-bank sectors.
First, judging from special inspection results by the
FSA, I suspect the Koizumi administration has decid-
ed to postpone the resolution.According to the FSA,
no major banks are under-capitalized.As a superficial
matter of BIS standards, capital might be sufficient.
But in reality in the major banks, tier one core capi-
tal is ¥18 trillion, but there are two tricky items
which are included in the tier one; that is ¥6 trillion
of deferred tax assets that present allowances for the
future income tax deduction, and ¥5 trillion of public
funds that is not common stock and is expected to
be repaid in the future. In sum, the hardcore capital is
only one-third of the stated ¥18 trillion.Today, both
banking experts and the Japanese people consider
additional capital injection to the major banks to be
necessary sometimes. Under the circumstances, we
always have to be mindful of possible contingencies in
the financial system.
Second, the weak earning power of Japanese
banks undercuts the positive effect of a resolu-
tion. Japanese banks’ return on equity is below 15
percent, which is substantially low compared with
U.S. banks, which generally keep over 25 percent.
Three factors can be pointed out: low interest
rate spreads, low service fee earnings, and high
credit cost. There have been structural and his-
torical grounds that Japanese banks’ lending prac-
tices have traditionally been based upon collater-
al evaluation. They have established no effective
risk-based pricing model derived from cash flow
evaluation.
Third, corporate governance systems should also be
addressed. As a result of major bank mergers, over
15 major banks have now been consolidated into four
big groups. I think the recent Mizuho problem,where
ATMs and fund transfer computer systems clogged
because of insufficient system integration testing in
the process of mergers raised all types of corporate
governance questions since the trouble apparently
could have been avoided if the new management had
had the merger preparation process in order.Also, it
is reported that although in the early stages comput-
er system experts had warned that trouble might
occur, top management ignored the warnings in
order to keep the merger schedule unchanged.We
have to rebuild the corporate governance system
that can take back resilience of Japanese firms.
Fourth is cross-shareholding. Along with life insur-
ance companies, Japanese banks are one of the
largest investors in the stock market. The banks
hold over ¥40 trillion worth of equities on the bal-
ance sheets for the purpose of maintaining long-
term relationships with their borrowers. In reality,
they prove to be unprofitable assets.Thus, banks are
expected to sell equities outright over ¥4 trillion
within two years. At this juncture, banks’ sharehold-
ing purchase corporations, the government spon-
sored equity purchasing entity was established early
this year in order to prevent a massive wave of sell-
ing from putting further downward pressure on the
stock market. In my opinion, it is ridiculous.The sim-
ple share price-supporting device addresses none of
the fundamental problems associated with the cross
shareholding and double gearing between banks and
life insurance companies. I think enhancing corporate
governance and improving transparency through full
disclosure with a reliable accounting system is the
only way to solve the structural problem.
What must we do to get out of the current crisis
situation? Conventional wisdom. It is apparent that
it is just through the disposal of bad loans and put-
ting the real assets—for example, real estate or
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viable divisions of failed corporations—back to
work in the real economy is an inefficient way. How
do we do it? I think the answer is quite simple.
First, establish stringent rules for evaluating bank
assets and provision sufficiently and recognize loss-
es. Second, remove bad loans from balance sheets
and, if necessary, nationalize banks or inject public
funds.Third, revitalize asset markets by way of tax
and legal system improvements.
These measures are adopted in the U.S., Sweden
and more recently in Korea. In Korea, 7 percent of
GDP has already been spent to clean up banks’ bal-
ance sheets. Aggressive asset disposal was quite
effective in de-leveraging the corporate sector in
Korea. With respect to bank restructuring, the
Korean government took aggressive actions such
as capital reduction, drastic business remodeling,
management from outside the banks and compul-
sory mergers.We already know what we must do.
At this juncture, the weak capital market function
must be addressed. It is apparent that when a banking
system does not function well, capital markets should
play the role of financial intermediary. Japan’s capital
market, however, has failed to attract both foreign
and domestic investors. Out of ¥1,420 trillion worth
of household financial assets, only 7 percent is in
equity markets, and only 2 percent in mutual funds,
while 54 percent is in bank deposits and postal sav-
ings. Let me make four points regarding this.
First, investors do not trust Japan’s accounting sys-
tem. This must be improved, such as the quick
introduction of an accounting rule for impairment
of fixed assets. Second, the creation of a strong and
independent SEC is necessary to ensure fair trad-
ing.Third, an independence of mutual fund industry
from apparent broker dealers must be protected
for the purpose of enhancing transparency and
restoring trust of investors. Fourth, capital gain
taxes should be effectively reduced to zero as long
as the Japanese economy lacks the risk capital in
macro terms. I believe that as long as Japanese
banks have limited capacity to manage assets well,
we have to improve capital market.
In conclusion, there are three possible scenarios for
the course of reform in the financial system. First is a
compulsory and aggressive resolution like in Korea;
second is to continue to conceal the current crisis
situation; and third is a pre-emptive, sporadic nation-
alization, like in Sweden’s case.Many people may think
that my remarks are pessimistic about the future
reform of the Japanese banking system. In the short
term I must admit that, but in the longer run that is
not correct. I am optimistic about the long term
because the problem we are facing was originally
caused by the speculative bubble burst. From the
speculative bubble in Holland in the 17th century and
the South Sea Bubble in England in the 18th century,
various forms of economic bubbles have occurred.
However, history tells us that no nation has disap-
peared or declined simply due to the bubble burst.
However, behind the prolonged crises lies our gov-
ernance problem not only in the business sector
but also in the political sector. As massive political
scandal has broken out in the Diet in these times,
Prime Minister Koizumi and his administration seem
to be losing political determination to proceed
with the resolution. In this sense, Japan’s situation is
such that everything is politics. As I mentioned,
every market participant acknowledges that banks’
core capital is fragile, which means if accounting
changes, capital shortage must be recognized and
the crisis can suddenly emerge—meaning any polit-
ical switch can be a possibility for drastic changes
in the course of reform policy.
The problem we are facing is not the inability to envi-
sion solutions, but the inability to put them into prac-
tice. As a politician I believe what is most needed
now is the political will to restore the functions of
financial markets for the sake of national interests, as
well as for the benefit of the international economy.
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“Investors do not trust 
Japan’s accounting system.”
Q: If the problems have been identified and the
solutions are out there, what are the political
forces that are against reform and why? 
SHIOZAKI: The reason why the bad loan resolu-
tion has not been accomplished yet is that heavily
in-debt companies, major banks, and the FSA are
all in the same boat.They’re playing the politics
and avoiding whatever disadvantage might occur.
Q: Do you foresee any changes in the nation’s
policy leadership in the financial services area?
And do you think there will be any new major
bank reorganizations or consolidations, mergers in
the near future?
SHIOZAKI: Koizumi is now thinking of reshuffling
the cabinet and that might change things a little
bit. But it’s all up to the prime minister how far he
would go in that resolution.And the second
answer is yes, probably there are going to be
some waves of consolidation in the financial indus-
tries. But that might happen when a crisis comes
and otherwise not much would happen, as I see it.
PATRICK: So, the good news is that you will have
a crisis?
SHIOZAKI: Well, since I said in the speech that the
non-performing loan resolution has been post-
poned that means nothing has changed. So, we
might have one, sometime.
Q: Do you think that the Japanese public is ready
to take the hard medicine that needs to be done
to solve the banking crisis? 
SHIOZAKI: I think they were last year and I think
still it is never too late, and Koizumi can persuade
them of that.
Q: I sense some resentment in Japan about recent
government bond rating downgrades by Moody’s
and S&P, and I wonder if you feel that those
downgrades are fair and whether or not there
could be resentment in the general public that the
outside world or certain Western institutions are
treating Japan unfairly?
SHIOZAKI: I wouldn’t say it’s fair or not because 
it is a practice of the private sector.What we
should get from that as a message is that we fail
to convince our controllability and manageability
on the economic policy front.
Q: Do you think Japan still needs postal saving 
as a financial institution? Because it’s huge and
everyone thinks it’s deterring healthy competition
around Japanese financial industries.
SHIOZAKI: Well, since I’m not in my election dis-
trict, I would say yes. It’s unhealthy to have ¥370
trillion worth of public money through postal sav-
ings and postal insurance, which is over one-third
or one-quarter of total household financial assets.
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The exhibits before you reflect a number of items, namely ¥35 trillion of non-performing loans as of September
2001 (see Figure 1), and for fiscal year 1992 through 2001, cumulative loan losses of ¥74 trillion (Figure 2) and
cumulative government assistance of ¥23 trillion (Figure 3).You heard from a prior speaker that there were
$200 billion spent by the U.S. on its situation. Japan has already spent more than that, but it is obviously a much
smaller economy.That helps you get a feel for the idea that these problems are much larger in scale relative to
Japan than they were to here. In the last four years institutions with ¥33 trillion of deposits have failed, and in
the 12 months ending in February of 2002, ¥28 trillion migrated from time deposits to demand deposits
because people were afraid that with the lowering of the deposit insurance ceiling to ¥10 million on time
deposits that they would have credit problems.
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Figure 2
There are 20 major hypotheses about Japan’s bank-
ing crisis that have been suggested by various
observers. The official position is that the govern-
ment asserts that the problems are largely identi-
fied and under control.The remaining 19 opinions
are more negative. First, banks in the economy are
so intertwined that neither can be fixed until both
are fixed. Second, bank problems are so large that
there must be wholesale nationalization, interna-
tional takeovers or both.Third, the yen may have to
drop to 150 to the dollar to stop internal asset
deflation and to stimulate exports. Fourth, Japanese
banks should improve their BIS ratios and returns
on assets by securitizing loans. Fifth, the banks have
such severe IT hardware and software problems
that it will take years and billions of dollars to solve
them. Sixth, banking problems can be solved only by
radically changing management practices, not just
infusing capital. Seventh, the banks have virtually all
of their equity capital invested in cross holdings of
equity and therefore are fundamentally unsound.
Eighth, banks need higher interest rates so that they
can earn their way out of the NPLs but the bor-
rowers cannot afford to pay more.
Ninth, until Japan’s public debt markets develop,
demands on the banks will continue to exceed their
capacity.Tenth, many feel that banking consolidation
simply creates institutions that are too big to fail, and
therefore, guarantee eventual de facto nationaliza-
tion. Eleventh, dropping government insurance on all
deposits over ¥10 million next April 1st, some peo-
ple fear, may create a new banking crisis.Twelfth, it is
essential to privatize and break up the postal savings
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“Banking problems can 
be solved only by 
radically changing
management practices, 
not just infusing capital.”
system so that it does not compete so effectively for
deposits. Thirteenth, even the recent special FSA
investigations may not have forced the banks to
acknowledge all of their problem loans. Fourteenth,
even the expanded mandate of RCC has not creat-
ed enough buying and selling of non-performing
loans. Fifteenth, there also may be a new crisis in
2002–03 as very large amounts of banks’ subordi-
nated debt mature and need to be refinanced to pre-
serve capital ratios. Sixteenth, real pessimists articu-
late that new loans are going bad as rapidly as the
banks write off the old ones, so they make no net
progress. Seventeenth, bank capital is weaker than it
appears because as you heard earlier, 31 percent of
it is deferred tax assets, at best a highly contingent
item. Eighteenth, corporations have such high lever-
age and such low returns on assets that huge NPL
levels are inevitable and permanent. The last and
most pessimistic is the observation of some that
government may just be paying lip service to reform.
My own conclusions are first to reject the last opin-
ion.The Koizumi administration is making an earnest
effort to deal with the problems of the banks. In my
view there is validity to the other 18 concerns, and
because there are so many complex issues and
because the banking crisis is so many times larger
relative to Japan than ours was relative to the U.S., it
will take more time to resolve. But if three factors
occur over the present fiscal year, I believe that real
progress will be evident. First and most important,
the yen must drop significantly relative to the dollar.
A $0.20 decline in the exchange ratio would add about
1 percentage point to the Japanese GDP. The foreign
exchange change would also arrest the internal defla-
tion of asset values.Whenever a currency is seriously
over valued, internal deflation inevitably follows.
Second, the FSA must really pressure the banks to
divest of NPLs. The only real way to resolve the
adequacy of reserve issues is to have the loans sold.
Then there will be no debate. If they are sold to
investors who make them into equity and help the
borrowers restructure both their balance sheets
and their businesses, the commercial sector of Japan
will be rationalized and improved.
Third, government must stick to its announced
schedule of dropping the insurance limit on all depo-
sits to ¥10 million as of April 1, 2003. Market versus
long term will be stricter regulators than any gov-
ernment, but this would be the first time that
depositors will really have to make credit decisions
about banks and, therefore, government must take
measures to prevent the wholesale flight of munici-
pal and provincial government deposits, otherwise
there could be runs on the smaller institutions.
If these three factors occur, I believe that a year
from now Japan Society will be able to host a fol-
low-up conference with justifiably a more confident
tone than is possible today.
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ETSURO HONDA, Deputy Consul General (Finance) in New York, 
Minister at the Japanese Embassy in the United States
THERE IS SO MUCH OF A PESSIMISTIC
atmosphere about Japan’s financial sector both inside
and outside Japan. I have to be kind of contradictory
here today and sometimes I have to speak contrary to
Mr. Shiozaki, whom I respect greatly. I want to be real-
istic but I don’t want to dramatize too much about
what’s going on in Japan. What I want to say today is
basically that the Japanese banks—as long as the major
“Japanese banks—as 
long as the major banks
are concerned—are safe 
and sound and solid.”
banks are concerned—are safe and sound and
solid. I have to admit that we have to go muddling
through but the steady approach is the only way to
go. So, there are no dramatized approaches that are
clear.We have to go forward step by step and the
FSA and the Ministry of Finance is determined to
do so.
First, I would like to touch upon the results of the
special inspections that Mr. Shiozaki mentioned.The
Financial Services Agency (FSA) has published the
results of the special inspections last month. The
special inspections focused on the loan classifica-
tion of large borrowers whose stock prices, external
ratings and other indicators had been undergoing
significant changes. The inspections gathered broad
attention in Japan because some people insisted
that some banks, depending on the results of the
inspection, might need a public fund injection. Out
of 149 targeted borrowers, 71 were downgraded,
including 34 re-classified as “in danger of bankruptcy”
or below. The capital adequacy ratio, however,
ranged between slightly above 10 percent and around
11.5 percent for internationally operating banks,
and between slightly above 8 percent and around
10.5 percent for domestically operating banks, even
after strict special inspections. As far as the major
banks are concerned, they have a sufficient amount
of their own capital and do not need public fund
injections.
Non-performing loans are a heavy burden on the
banking system and are partially responsible for the
sluggish economy in Japan. New non-performing
loans, however, have emerged mainly because of
deflation. Even if banks take drastic measures to dis-
pose their non-performing loans, new non-perform-
ing loans appear continuously under deflationary
conditions. I think the most fundamental problem is
deflation of assets such as land and equity after the
bubble bursts,which caused a demand shortage, and
therefore, deflation of commodity prices.
Under deflation, the virtual burdens of existing
debts increase substantially and real term interest
rates become high. So, under deflation, it is very nat-
ural for enterprises, particularly those that already
own heavy debts and real estate, to fall into difficul-
ties in repaying their debts as scheduled even if they
have profitable projects.Therefore, measures to dis-
pose non-performing loans should tackle at the
same time both microeconomic tasks, namely bank-
ing and enterprise sector reform, and also macro-
economic tasks—namely, anti-deflation measures.
Basically, the non-performing loans’ disposal is a
matter of the private sector, but in the case that
non-performing loans amount to such a level that it
affects the macroeconomy, the government should
intervene in the disposal.There are several ways for
the government to take measures: first, setting a
time frame for final disposal; second, provisioning
and providing frameworks for facilitated disposal of
non-performing loans and for corporate restructur-
ing; third, strengthening bank supervision and dis-
closure of banks’ financial status; fourth, promoting
consolidation of financial institutions. The govern-
ment has called for the major banks to remove out-
standing and non-performing loans classified as “in
danger of bankruptcy” off banks’ balance sheets, and
those classified as “in bankruptcy” to be removed
over a two-year-period. New non-performing loans
have to be eliminated within three years from the
date they are classified as a non-performing loan.
The FSA has been strictly monitoring the progress
being made in the disposal of non-performing loans.
The FSA set up more concrete goals, as Mr. Ross
mentioned just now. Last month, in order to accel-
erate the removal of the non-performing loans
from banks’ balance sheets under the time frame I
mentioned a moment ago, banks are now request-
ed to tackle specific measures to dispose, in princi-
ple, half of such loans within a year and a major part
of such loans—I mean around 80 percent within
two years.
Removal of non-performing loans from banks’ bal-
ance sheets may be carried out in three ways.The
first way is through the sale of these loans.The sec-
ond way is through the legal procedures based
upon the Bankruptcy Law or the Civil Rehabilita-
12
CONFERENCE — May 2, 2002
tion Law, similar to U.S. Chapter 11 proceedings.
The third is through out-of-court corporate work-
out with such financial measures as securitization
and debt-equity swap arrangements. All major
banks have been urged to accelerate the disposal of
non-performing loans by such measures, as a sale
to buyers including the Reconstruction and
Collection Corporation (RCC). The RCC is also
expected to aggressively purchase non-performing
loans. The RCC was established as a 100 percent
subsidiary of the Deposit Insurance Corporation
to facilitate banks’ resolution of non-performing
loans problems. The RCC has now expanded its
functions in securitization of non-performing loans
and real estate’s collateral utilizing recent reli-
censed trust banking. The RCC has already put
such securitization in practice. Furthermore, the
RCC has been granted flexibility in deciding prices
at fair value to facilitate the purchase of non-per-
forming loans based on the recently revised Financial
Reconstruction Law.
The RCC is to make efforts to resolve such pur-
chased non-performing loans within three years.
The RCC is also to actively deal with corporate
restructuring. It has already given results for more
than 40 cases of corporate restructuring. In addi-
tion, the RCC is to participate in the “Corporate
Restructuring Funds, what we call “deleveraging
funds,” to be established by the governmental
financial institutions such as the Development Bank
of Japan (DBJ) and private investors.
I heard some funds have been established.The DBJ
is ready to invest up to a total of ¥100 billion in
these funds.The funds purchase stocks that banks
and the RCC have acquired through debt-equity
swaps. These funds are expected to be powerful
vehicles for corporate restructuring.
In order to strengthen the bank supervision the
FSA decided to establish a de facto resident inspec-
tor system. Inspection units are to be reorganized
corresponding to each major banking group so that
each unit can continue, throughout a year, to inspect
the banking group under its responsibility. In addi-
tion, the FSA is going to conduct inspections
focused on specific functions such as internal audit
systems and the risk management systems across
the banking group by special teams, including amply
experienced experts recruited from the private
sector.The FSA will explore measures to promote
consolidation of financial institutions with particu-
larly regional institutions in mind to strengthen
their profitability and to ensure smooth financing of
small and medium-sized enterprises.
I am not going to say much about microeconomic
policy today, but all of you here understand its
importance. Without getting out of deflation, we
will not be able to get completely out of the non-
performing loans problems.There’s no “good defla-
tion” in the real world. Deflation is punishing bor-
rowing corporations and entrepreneurs, which are
the engines for economic development. Deflation is
an agonizing problem which impacts society. Since
deflation is a monetary phenomenon, the major
player here is, needless to say, monetary policy.We
continue to need expansionary monetary policy.
As for budgetary spending, there is little room for
quantitative increase. However we can make budg-
etary spending more effective by giving priority to
spending that will induce more private investments
such as urban revitalization, science and technolo-
gy and elder care. The structural reform such as
deregulation will not only elevate potential eco-
nomic growth on the supply side, but will also stim-
ulate economy on the demand side.
Now, we are seeing some signs of a bottoming out
of the economy in Japan, as Mr. Shiozaki mentioned.
It is high time for us to intensify our efforts to real-
ize sustainable economic growth.The FSA and the
MOF, under the Koizumi administration, is deter-
mined to steadily move forward. Today we have a
lot of investors and experts here.Your investments
and advice are always welcome to Japan.
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I WANT TO START WITH three general state-
ments. First, today I believe we are talking about the
world’s most significant international economic
problem. It always surprises me how little attention
it gets. Second, this problem is getting worse, not
better. To date, the Japanese government’s policies
have attempted to contain rather than solve the
asset quality problem. I believe that containment is
not a sustainable strategy as we move toward the
end of this decade. Third, during this containment
the interplay of declining asset values, demography,
the rating agencies, and government fiscal and mon-
etary handcuffs are all acting to reduce the available
policy options that the Japanese officials will have
when they finally confront the need for a solution.
It goes without saying that it is impossible to project
a healthy economy in Japan over the near or medium
terms unless the country enjoys a healthy banking
system. In turn, and connected to that, it is impossi-
ble to project sustained growth throughout most of
Asia without a healthy Japan. I think one of the many
under-analyzed phenomena in the last 10 years was
the role of the Japanese banks in the so-called Asia
Crisis in 1997–98. Most of the bank capital that left
Southeast Asia before and during the crisis was in
fact Japanese, and it was reacting to the need to bring
capital home to shore up weakened balance sheets
and equity accounts for regulatory reasons.
That syndrome or behavior pattern is really para-
mount when you look at the Japanese situation
itself. First, we are dealing with extraordinarily
tough, hard asset deflation. It is difficult to come up
with parallels to that hard asset deflation, which is
all around collateral. Some of the parallels are defla-
tionary periods in more or less agricultural soci-
eties, and those had a duration much longer than
the kinds of business cycles one gets in a more
manufacturing-based society. At the moment, the
essence of this problem, as it affects the Japanese
banking system, is deflation in real estate values
affecting collateral accounts.As asset values decline,
bad loans multiply.
Connected to that is capital adequacy. I think the
whole BIS standard issue with respect to Japan is an
interesting one.When history is written in the next
century, I think the treatment of the cross-holding
stocks in Japanese banks at the original BIS capital
allocation process by the world’s regulators will be
seen as a mistake. Absent that, please remember
that BIS capital standards, whether it is Basle I or
Basle II, have the functionally equivalent effect on a
financial institution that the gold standard had on
countries in the 1920s and ’30s. If you write off a
loan and do not have new equity to replace that
asset within your capital account, you are forced to
shed good assets to keep yourself in regulatory
compliance.This is the self-fulfilling prophecy going
on in Japan, and it is one of the reasons why it is so
difficult to solve the problem.
A third factor, profitability, I think—and I take
Wilbur’s point about how the size of this problem
dwarfs the size of the U.S. in the early 1990s.
Nevertheless, one of the ways the U.S. banks did get
better, especially the commercial banks as opposed
to the S&Ls, was that they were given a sweetheart
interest rate climate where they could put very
simple interest margin profits into their capital
account and try to solve that gold standard prob-
lem with the BIS capital ratios. I think that is a pol-
icy prescription which I will get to, but there is not
much of an interest margin right now in Japan at
these nominal interest rate levels.
Market perceptions are another factor that every-
one has to keep in mind. I had a friend that works
at Citigroup who once described the rating agen-
cies as the people who go out on the battlefield
and shoot the wounded.That was in the midst of a
happy negotiation with the Korean government.
But when you consider that, and consider how
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much a part Japan is of the international economy,
the way the rating agencies are going at the moment
vis à vis Japan, this crisis elicits so many declarative
statements that people never think through.One of
the most common is that Japan is still a net lender
to the world. It is absolutely true. Japan has hun-
dreds of billions of dollars in net foreign assets. But
in fact, the foreign assets and foreign liabilities are
not matched.The Japanese institutions with the net
foreign assets are not the Japanese institutions with
the net liabilities.As a result, the banking system as
a day-to-day participant in the international mar-
kets is vulnerable to many things. In an era where
there is a declining yen, most Japanese banks access
the international market system to do something in
dollars, euros and yen. As the yen deteriorates,
other participants’ (American, European, etc.)
exposure to the Japanese banks grows as a result
of that devaluation.They are obviously prone to the
same rating agency scrutiny as Japan is.Again, it is a
self-fulfilling prophecy. Many people call that “wrong
way exposure” or “correlated exposure.” I am say-
ing that notwithstanding the fact that most
arrangements of big international banks with
Japanese banks in this day and age are collateral-
ized, exposure to Japan will be an increasingly “hot
topic.”
Finally, I think there are several policy prescriptions.
First, there must be a shift away from containment
to solution. Second, there must be greater trans-
parency, disclosure and regulation. Third, there
must be confidence among Japan’s international
partners. Where is the bottom? No one knows
right now.The core of the Japanese problem is real
estate. There could be government programs that
take over bank-owned real estate in some form or
another, and separate that out from the corpora-
tions that cannot pay their bills.That is a typology
that might be politically easier for the Japanese
authorities to confront. Fourth, if we are going to
devalue the yen (and again I agree with Wilbur),
every effort must be made not to do it in a dra-
matic or quick fashion.This underscores my point;
the longer this goes on, the more dramatic the
solution will have to be.What the world does not
need is a big foreign exchange move at the same
time as some sort of capital controls are put in
Japan. The effect of that on Southeast Asia, Korea
and especially China is not something any of us
want to think about.
15
Can Japan’s Ailing Bank System Be Cured?
JAMES McGINNIS, Senior Analyst, Mizuho Securities Japan
GIVEN THEIR PRESENT CAPITAL ADEQUACY ratios, the Japanese banks have basically done all
they can do. Japanese banks will solve this problem within the time period that they are able to acquire the
earnings.They are going to write off bad debts at the same pace that they earn money. No amount of gov-
ernment regulation is going to change their minds. From the Bank of Japan’s standpoint, Governor Hayami
has already engaged the enemy. It comes down to whether or not Mr. Shiozaki, the Ministry of Finance, is
prepared to play ball because ultimately it matters if this will end on peaceful terms or in full-scale war?
“Notwithstanding the fact
that most arrangements 
of big international banks
with Japanese banks in
this day and age are
collateralized, exposure 
to Japan will be an
increasingly ‘hot topic.’”
I think that the Resolution Credit Corporation
(RCC) is the primary solution to this.You have to
use the RCC to buy the bad debts from the banks
at a level that will not bankrupt them.You cannot
apply a static solution and inject money into the
Japanese banks because you do not know what the
size of the problem is.The argument about market
value is ridiculous because there is no secondary
market to price the loans. The only transfer price
can be the original loan volume minus the reserve
amount, and you have to decide on what the
reserve amount is. If you decide the reserve
amount is 20 percent, they are gone. If you decide
the reserve amount is going to be something less,
then they are not gone.You must decide that num-
ber, and then take those loans off the balance
sheets of the banks.
How do you fund the problem? You can fund the
problem by having the Japanese banks lend the
Japanese government the money to buy the loans off
the balance sheets.The Japanese government issues
a guarantee. It becomes sovereign risk.They are not
counted as risk assets. Take those companies into
the RCC. If you want to restructure the companies
do so with government money. I am not an expert
on the auto industry but, in fact, the reconstruction
of Nissan is not because Carlos Ghosn is a genius,
but because the Japanese Development Bank put
¥500 billion into that company.There is no way that
IBJ and Fuji, which comprises the present Mizuho
Group along with Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, could have
handled that problem. If you want to reconstruct the
companies, take them into the RCC, use the Japan
Development Bank, and lend the money to them. If
they go bankrupt or you decide to put them into
receivership, then you have two options: the govern-
ment can pay for all those losses, or you can allow
the banks to amortize them over a period of time
just as you are allowing the under-funded pension
liabilities in corporate Japan to be amortized over a
15-year period.This is pretty much the only way it is
going to work.
As for double treatment of large borrowers and
small borrowers, the bad debt problem in Japan has
now reached the cyclical side. In the West, you
rarely see the cyclical side because the economy
cleans itself on an ongoing basis. In the final analy-
sis, if the bad debt problem is not addressed, it will
not be the major banks that go bankrupt. It will be
the Japanese regional banks. The regional banks,
regardless of their position or country, always pro-
tect the big borrowers.They always build firewalls
around them.
My experience of nine years in the banking indus-
try on the credit side, before I became an equity
analyst, was waking up every morning to the news
that some dress shop, coffee shop or dry cleaner
went bust. Are these small companies going bank-
rupt every day? Yes. They comprise 70 to 80 per-
cent of the loans of a regional bank. They do not
comprise 70 to 80 percent of the loans of a major
bank. That is where the ultimate problem is going
to crop up if you allow the cyclical side to contin-
ue. I think it is a rather simple problem. It is a mat-
ter of the Japanese government engaging it. You
cannot give a blood transfusion to somebody and
say we are going to give him a pint of blood
because you do not know if he is going to bleed
two pints or three.You must get something in there
that deals with this in a flexible manner.
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“If the bad debt problem
is not addressed, it 
will not be the major
banks that go bankrupt. 
It will be the Japanese
regional banks.” 
Q: If one advocates a depreciation of the yen to
150 or whatever number in that range, how does
one avoid this becoming a very rapid adjustment
with all kinds of problems once it becomes a poli-
cy objective? 
ROSS: Nobody is saying the yen should go from
128 to 150 in 24 hours, nor is anyone suggesting
that it should be a formally articulated policy of
the government. I think international politics
would not permit that. I do think what is essential
and probably the way to get there would be at a
creeping pace.As some of you may be aware, the
yen had been a lot closer to 100 two and a half
years ago than to the 130 odd level that it got to.
And I just think that the way of the world should
be that the yen gradually morphs its way down to
something like 150.
Q: Mr. Honda said there is no good deflation.
Maybe asset deflation could be handled differently
by just letting things rip fairly early after a bubble,
and for the market to clear and get it behind you? 
HONDA:Yes, there is good deflation theoretically,
but I said there is no good deflation in the real
world. If the deflation that is happening really in
Japan is a good deflation, the GDP should be
increased because the good deflation might be
caused by the production, productivity increase or
cut cost of the distribution system. In that case,
the GDP also should be increased at the same
time. But what’s really happening in Japan is GDP
is not increasing upward. So, the deflation is just
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THE FUTURE OF JAPAN’S ECONOMIC rules depends largely on its banking system where banks
can make a profit.There is some good news to witness reforms going on in such areas as the accounting
standards, the bankruptcy laws, etc., but not enough.The first and utmost concern is whether initiatives to
eliminate non-performing loans will bear fruit.As it started last month, the termination of the full guaran-
tee on the banks’ time deposit will force competitions in the banking industry, correcting “over-banking”
through industry consolidation. Something we have seen more of in recent years. In brief, the Japanese
economy could start to grow by weeding out “zombie” banks and the companies. But, unfortunately, the
Japanese government and the banks seem to be stuck again.
A useful way to think of Japan’s economic situation is to look at the model our economist Robert Feldman
uses: the “CRIC” cycle. This cycle shows that poor policy responses to crises will prevent substantial
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improvements, leading to complacency. Naturally,
the complacency generates another crisis. Japan has
gone through three of these cycles over the last ten
years. By the fourth crisis, at the beginning of 2001,
we had all hoped that this time, with Prime Minister
Koizumi’s new initiative, Japan would finally be able
to make strong and immediate reforms to break out
of this cycle and realize a fresh, new era of eco-
nomic health and growth. During the past year,
Koizumi’s reform agenda suggested a need for sev-
eral surgeries.But what is happening is various anes-
thesia are being used and no serious surgeries are
being performed. Accordingly, the ultimate and
effective responses have not come on the scene yet.
One of the frustrating things in the financial sector
is that Japanese banks, a central factor for Japan to
break out of this CRIC cycle, have not been able to
produce a viable new revenue model, leaving the
conventional “jack of all trades.” 
I believe we need to take more drastic steps to
reconstruct a healthy banking system and thus
rehabilitate the Japanese economy more quickly.
There are different alternatives with varying
degrees of speed of action and government inter-
vention. Figure 4 presents four possible scenarios
in terms of the methodology. The vertical axis
shows the degree of speed and the horizontal axis
shows government intervention.
Quadrant two is the “hard-landing” approach,
meaning the government forces the bad bank to
exit. In quadrant one and quadrant three, these sce-
narios take a “soft-landing” approach, meaning that
you wait for better visibility by circling over the air-
port and eventually run out of fuel and crash.
Quadrant four represents no action, or “the rising
tide will cover all” approach.
I believe the top right quadrant, nationalization with
RCC’s active involvement, is an option Japan needs
to push banks and corporate restructurings for-
ward.This approach requires that first, banks assess
their loan portfolio very stringently and swiftly and
set aside sufficient reserves; second, banks with a
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Japanese banks—how to proceed?
Four scenarios of how to deal with NPLs
• No public money
• Increased bankruptcies
• RCC begins to sell
• No public money
• Gradual bankruptcies
• RCC does not sell (status quo)
• Public money
• Banks nationalized
• RCC begins to sell
• Public money
• Gradual bankruptcies
• RCC does not sell 
Figure 4
capital shortage should be divided into “good
banks” without NPLs and “bad banks” with NPLs;
and third, “good banks” and NPLs should be sold
separately via a market mechanism. In this option,
taxpayer support is indispensable.Therefore,“tran-
sparency” and “justice” through the market mech-
anism are a must to this healthy process.
Much needs to be done, but we have a chance to
do things right. Everyone benefits from a
reformed, strong and open Japanese economy and
financial sector. These changes involve many play-
ers from different backgrounds, each with a posi-
tive role to play. For bank management, the time is
now to stop waiting and wishing for God to save
the economy. Rather, to reinforce restructuring
efforts more aggressively and create a strong earn-
ing model, set an imperative management goal
such as the ROE, or the numerical target of the
shareholder value. If it is not achieved within a rea-
sonable time frame, say a year or two, the man-
agement should exit. If it is achieved, they should
be properly rewarded.
For the corporate world, it is time to focus anew
on the core businesses to regain profitability and
productivity. For the regulator, focus on overseeing
the banks’ management goals and results. Stop dis-
cretional guidance. Rather, encourage bank manage-
ment in order to produce a more profitable busi-
ness model. For the nation’s leader, push forward
with an agenda of reforms without getting side
tracked by vested interests in the limited sectors of
the economy. He must not hesitate to use taxpay-
ers’ money for resolving this banking problem. For
the investors, Japanese or non Japanese, consider
the potential opportunities from Japan’s restructur-
ing, and the very attractive returns on investing risk
capital and management skill in Japanese assets. If
we can all push forward, challenge becomes oppor-
tunity for everyone.
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JAPAN HAS ACCOMPLISHED a great deal over the last two years in putting into place techniques
that allow for corporate restructuring.They have adopted the INSOL principles, which are guidelines for
out-of-court restructuring.They adopted the Civil Rehabilitation Proceeding, which is similar to Chapter
11, and they have actually done some DIP loans through the Development Bank of Japan.
We know these can all be improved, and in fact they all are being focused upon in Japan. However, it is not
the lack of technique that is inhibiting restructuring in Japan. Japan is not restructuring its companies in an
effective way to reallocate capital, notwithstanding all these accomplishments.
Why is restructuring so important and what can we do to stimulate restructuring? Figure 5 compares how
different countries address problems when they occur in their economic cycle.The left-hand corner of the
figure illustrates when the company first gets in trouble.The right-hand corner represents liquidation of the
company.The U.S. has developed techniques over the years to fix companies early.The UK’s law is not as
effective as the U.S. in doing that, but they still have managed to create informal systems in the UK to fix
“For bank management,
the time is now to stop
waiting and wishing for
God to save the economy.”
companies early. Fixing companies early enough
creates jobs because you are reallocating the capi-
tal in time. Unfortunately, Japan fixes companies
down in the lower part of the quadrant. Every time
you wait to fix a company, regardless of where you
go in the world, you shift from a foundation of
growth to losses.You shift from the potential of job
creation to job loss.Had companies like Mycal been
addressed two or three years earlier, the pain
would have been far less for Japan.
What do we do when we restructure? What is it all
about? Why do we emphasize restructuring? Those
of us who restructure simply reallocate capital.You
try and get capital from a nonproductive use to a
more productive use. Figure 6 illustrates approaches
one may use restructuring three different compa-
nies; a good company, which needs fixing; a bad com-
pany, which really has no future but it has some very
good businesses within it; and a bad company that
has no good businesses with some capital that is tied
up and not being used productively.What do we do?
In the good company we often do debt for equity
conversions.We sell their non-core assets, invest the
money in the core and fix the balance sheet. In the
bad company with some good businesses we take
the good businesses and put it in the hands of some-
one who can invest money in the businesses.When
we liquidate a company at the end of the day,we free
up capital and assets, and they are used more pro-
ductively someplace else in society’s economy.
Frankly, all of them reallocate capital.The more effi-
ciently you approach restructuring when you have
a problem, the quicker you will rehabilitate your
company. I think one of the reasons the U.S. bounces
back so fast from downward economic cycles is
because we actually do that very well.
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enough creates jobs 
because you are reallocating
the capital in time.”
What will stimulate this in Japan? Until the banks in
Japan move from a reserve strategy to a value strat-
egy, it is not going to happen. They have to think
about how to maximize the value of the problem
loan.The only one that is going to get them to move
in that direction is the government, and the govern-
ment is going to require sticks and carrots to do it.
Whatever philosophy is developed, if you encourage
the banks to tackle a good company and make it
better, that will be good for the economy. But the
banks have to take a capital hit. Japan should reward
banks with capital if they take the right actions, and
toughen attitudes toward them if they do not.The
two must be intricately tied together.
We need a coordinated policy to get this done in
Japan, because when you look at the pieces that
have to fall in place for restructuring everybody has
a small role to play. It really does not fall well on any
one institution in Japan.
Japan should be thinking about what industries to
stimulate, how to do it, and how to integrate policy.
There are not enough people within the labor
group in Japan who know how to go into compa-
nies and turn them around. It is not a subject that
has been focused upon. We did not have those in
the U.S. in any meaningful way until the RTC. Now
we have a huge industry.There is a role to be played
to stimulate industrial growth in Japan.
I have recommended that there be a limited-term
minister appointed for the purpose of coordinating
policy for restructuring companies and banks in
Japan.This certainly could be part of the Office of
the Prime Minister.
In effect, when we put together the Deleveraging
Fund in Japan, it was a mini version of this. It was
building levels of cooperation between the FSA,
METI, the Ministry of Finance and Development of
Japan. The fund emerged only when consensus
among the agencies was achieved.
The more we can get good examples of Japanese
talent and Japanese money participating in this
process, the more accelerated the process of
restructuring will be in Japan.
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IN 1974 AND 1975 I was a member of the
United Auto Workers grinding crank shafts. I
remember walking out of the plant for the last day,
being laid off, being 18 years old and not particu-
larly worried about my future. I was off to college.
I also remember spending a year of my life with
other members of the United Auto Workers who
were not so sanguine about how they were going
to pay their mortgages and car payments, or feed
their children. They were looking out on a very
grim reality in corporate America. We should
always remember when we are critical of Japan or
impatient about the rate of change that we have
forgotten many of our own trials and tribulations.
Remember that Chrysler almost went bankrupt,
that IBM almost disappeared and that General
Electric was not always heralded as the industrial
success that it has been.
I have two general observations to make. First,
while there are many unique problems in Japan and
many unique elements of the business culture,
there are also many elements that parallel the U.S.
experience over the last 25 years. I would be
remiss if I did not mention that a large part of our
tentative success in Japan has been because we rec-
ognized very early on the uniqueness of the needs
and of the culture in Japan, and we are sensitive to
that. But there are many parallels in terms of where
corporate governance was in the U.S. 25 years ago
and in terms of the impediments we faced 25 years
ago. These parallels are valuable and instructive as
long as they are enrobed in the reality that Japan is
importantly unique.
The second observation from my anecdotal expe-
rience is that while there are many problems, con-
cerns and issues about the Japanese economy, the
glass is also half full given the extraordinary
strength of the underlying Japanese industrial fab-
ric. In the last month or two I read a McKinsey
study about the sources of productivity growth in
the U.S. over the last seven or eight years. The
counter and intuitive observation was made that a
great deal of the productivity came in sectors that
were not correlated with massive investments in
Internet technology or information systems—that
it was really the fundamental restructuring of many
basic industries including retail, wholesale, con-
struction and building products. Japan is a tremen-
dous tinderbox waiting for a spark that will unleash
decades of productivity growth.
To reinforce that, we have the example of the
recent U.S. economic experience. We seem to be
overcoming a really short-lived recession and facing
a dramatic rebound after what I thought at the time
was a death knell to the economy created by the
Internet and telecom bubble. We have recovered,
which says to me that we are getting better and bet-
ter at the process of reallocating capital in the U.S.
My experience in the U.S. is very supportive of that.
We have invested in the restaurant equipment
industry, which went from an industry that was
highly fragmented, large and unfocused to one that,
over the last decade, became much more focused
with a handful of competitors having broad capabil-
ities and product lines, and the ability to serve their
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“We should always
remember when we are
critical of Japan or
impatient about the rate 
of change that we have
forgotten many of our own
trials and tribulations.”
customers in truly extraordinary ways. The indus-
try has the ability to amortize engineering and
product development. We invested in the building
products arena where we saw one great company
leverage its relationships in the distribution channel
here in the U.S. to once again broaden its product
line, dramatically reduce its cost of distribution and
serve its customers better. I think that is a good
parallel with a number of industries in Japan.
We have now invested in six businesses in Japan.
Shinsei, obviously the most visible, but also a large
resort in southern Japan, Miyazaki Sea Gaia. Sea
Gaia was a resort that had an amazing amount of
investment and an equally amazing amount of debt.
It did not have enough money to do marketing or
really respond to the changing needs of its cus-
tomers, and it became very moribund.We have re-
launched the brand and brought over a world-class
hotelier. He told me yesterday that occupancy is up
22 percent year over year. The customer experi-
ence is remarkably different.
Likewise we bought Denon about nine months ago.
Denon is an audio and home theater supplier. It is
just about to merge with Marantz, which will give it
a broad product line, and even more powerful glob-
al distribution.We have invested in Alpha Purchase,
which was a start-up to go direct from the manu-
facturer to the customer and skip three levels of
distribution in maintenance repair and operating
items.The savings the customers of Alpha Purchase
experience are really remarkable just by moving
from the three-step distribution channel to direct
ship from manufacturer to customer.
We also invested in Nippon Columbia, which is the
oldest music company in Japan as a stored collec-
tion of Japanese traditional music.We brought in a
vibrant group, separated Denon, and focused its
resources on its core competence. I have received
the sales reports and they are actually creating hits,
which is what they were really all about in their
golden era.
My experience is very simple. It is sort of Occam’s
Razor of the investing world.There are many paral-
lels between the U.S. and Japan with respect to the
process of refocusing, reallocating assets and what
went on in the U.S. over the last 25 years.There are
many things we can learn, and we have learned and
applied much to our experience in Japan. So far we
have had very gratifying results. Whether it is at
Shinsei or Sea Gaia or Denon Marantz, Alpha Pur-
chase, or Nippon Columbia, we have really seen a
remarkably quick response to a little bit of leader-
ship and a lot of debt reduction. I have enormous
hope that once Japan gets the ball rolling down that
hill that it will pick up speed and create decades of
productivity growth and GDP growth.
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PATRICK: How do you get rid of the bad debt?
Who takes the hit? How is it distributed among
the banks, the equity owners and the government?
What are the policy implications?
COLLINS: In our case there is no simple answer to
that. In some cases we are taking the hit, we are
putting new money in to reduce the debt. In oth-
ers, they have gone through debt equity conver-
sions with existing lenders and shareholders.The
fundamentals are that the debt is an impediment
to doing the right thing from a business point of
view. It does not really matter to me as an
investor and a controlling shareholder in these
businesses who takes the hit or how it is taken.
The impediment I think historically in many cases
is that the companies are so grossly over-leveraged
they can’t get after the fundamentals of the busi-
ness and they become sort of zombies, as some-
body described it, sitting there marking time and
letting these great assets rust in the road. So, the
most important thing for us is what can we do to
serve the customer better and be better than the
competition and make sure that the balance sheet
doesn’t get in the way of our ability to mobilize
those resources. But in parallel, it doesn’t work
unless you’re creating a different structure in the
industry. It’s really all about how you get at the
fundamentals of making the business better com-
petitively and in its ability to serve the customer.
GITLIN: Restructuring in Japan is often associated
with reduction of debt, especially in the big com-
panies. Mr. Collin’s articulation is very accurate
because it is not the reduction of debt, it is what
are you investing in and whether you have
become a better strategic player after restructur-
ing.The concept used primarily more in Japan
than anywhere else is the concept of sponsor. In
Japan, when the company is in trouble you look
for a sponsor to come in. If the sponsor comes 
in properly with new money and new talent, it 
can be very productive for Japan.What probably
needs to be developed more in Japan in order to
take advantage of the talent of Tim and others,
and many others, is more debt for equity swaps,
more vehicles under which we can shift the capi-
tal from a non-productive use to a productive use.
We’re starting to see a little bit of that but are
not really finishing with a Tim-type solution, where
at the end of the day you have a much stronger
business plan and business solution.
HOTTA: Well, my observation is that the bank
management has been slow in terms of recogniz-
ing the seriousness of the non-performing loan.
As everybody here has witnessed the so-called
“golden recession,” that was the huge amount of
individual household assets and companies and
the country’s huge credit against the foreign coun-
tries and so forth. So the bank management has
been keeping the same attitudes. But the economy
gets more and more depressed and the people
have begun to wake up. For example, if you, as 
a frog, put yourself in cold water, you can very
pleasantly swim in the cold water. But perhaps the
water is being heated gradually and over time, you
are just about to die.Then you realize—oh, this is
really hot water! So, this is the kind of a situation
that we are now getting into.
PATRICK: Ken, why are Japanese willing to stay 
in much hotter water than elsewhere? Why does
this persist so long and only when you’re very
close to bankruptcy does restructuring occur?
HOTTA: Well, there have to be incentives for
every player including the regulators, policy mak-
ers, corporate bulls and of course, the bank man-
agement, to get this done quickly. If you were
rewarded to do so, I think the people will rush 
to move on.That’s my observation.
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I AM A JAPAN FAN. In my private sector experience, I developed the highest respect for Japanese
industry’s ability to rise to the challenge of world competition, and to challenge the rest of us to do the
same. Japanese companies like Sony and Toyota, among others, defined the notion of world-class man-
ufacturing, offering the world’s consumers value-priced, better products year after year, and daring com-
panies around the world to do the same.
In many ways, it was Japan’s challenge that forced the U.S. economy to shake off its malaise of the late
1970s and early ’80s, and become what it is today.The fact that American companies rose to that chal-
lenge, and greatly improved their own productivity and quality is in no small way due to the competition
that they faced from their Japanese counterparts.
Japanese workers, too, are among the most diligent and productive in the world, and they rightly feel
great pride for their country’s economic accomplishments in the past half-century.
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But the past decade has been difficult for all of us
who believe in the potential of the Japanese econ-
omy.After decades of world-leading growth, Japan’s
GDP grew by an average of just one percent annu-
ally over the past 10 years. Unemployment has
been rising, deflation has cast a long shadow on
consumption and investment, and banks and cor-
porations are heaped with bad and doubtful debt.
With such potential, and historic accomplishment,
why has Japan performed so poorly over the past
decade? More importantly, how can Japan return to
growth? The costs of underperformance are high,
both for Japan and for the rest of the world. Japan’s
citizens miss out on higher living standards and
Japanese young people are frozen out of the job
market.The rest of the world lacks a dynamic Japa-
nese market for its goods and services.
In fact, if Japan’s economy had grown over the past
10 years at its full potential of, say, 3 percent annual-
ly, real GDP would have been more than 20 percent
larger in 2001—that’s a difference of nearly $900 bil-
lion alone.And over the past decade, growing below
potential has cost Japan a total of nearly $5 trillion
in lost income or almost $40,000 in foregone
income per person.That lost income translates not
just into lower living standards, but also into $760
billion less investment to support future growth.
There are three areas for action in Japan that
would restore growth: first is ending deflation; the
second is overcoming financial sector problems;
and the third is deregulating and opening the econ-
omy to competition. I believe the last one is the
most important, but I’ll address them in the order
I’ve listed them.
For the last seven years, Japan has been mired in
deflation, as the broadest measure of prices, the
GDP deflator, has fallen by nearly 1 percent annual-
ly.The phenomenon of deflation is corroding Japan’s
economy, multiplying the burdens faced by debtors,
while discouraging investment and consumption.
Japan has to end expectations of persistent defla-
tion for the economy to recover and grow.
Last March, the Bank of Japan committed to expand
the money supply until inflation was at least zero.
Since then, the BOJ has sharply expanded the
growth rate of base money. But the growth rate of
broader money supply has not changed much, and
deflation remains entrenched.While sustained mon-
etary expansion is an important step for addressing
Japan’s economic woes, the expansion of base money
has not produced an expansion in bank lending.
Why are banks not lending? It is not because of a
lack of liquidity. Rather, anemic lending reflects deep
weakness in the balance sheets of the Japanese
banks and the corporate sector.
An important role of financial institutions is allo-
cate capital betweens savers and investors by pric-
ing credit fairly and accurately. A healthy financial
sector supplies funds to companies that can put the
money to the best use for their level of risk.
That has not been happening in Japan.There is plen-
ty of capital there, but too much of it continues to
prop up old investments gone bad, instead of going
after better opportunities and fueling growth.
Some banks are stuck in so many old, bad loans,
they are afraid to take any new risks, even in prom-
ising areas, further stunting the economy.
By some estimates, as much as a quarter of all bank
loans in Japan are in or near bankruptcy. Many of
these loans are described as “non-performing.”
Non-performing means “non-productive.” Loans
that are not performing are not producing for the
Japanese economy, or at least, they are not produc-
ing enough to justify their existence.
Bank lending is supposed to be an instrument for
growth, not a life support machine. If Japan’s finan-
cial markets were functioning properly, companies
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“The past decade has been
difficult for all of us who
believe in the potential of
the Japanese economy.”
that cannot pay their debts would restructure, or if
necessary, liquidate, so that their capital assets
could go toward more productive opportunities.
Financial institutions have to make tough choices
on their non-performing loans, and start making
new loans, priced appropriately for the level of risk.
For example, banks should offer the cheapest cred-
it to the world-beating export companies, which
also get financing from the international markets.
They should offer higher priced credit for entre-
preneurs and well-founded start-ups, which are
riskier than some established firms, but offer prom-
ise for future growth and new industries.And they
should impose the highest rates on credit to
unproductive and highly-indebted firms that have
no real plans for restructuring.
Because too much investment is going to low-
return uses, investment productivity has foundered.
Japan’s business capital stock increased more rapid-
ly than any other major industrial country over the
past 10 years, but it did not produce much growth.
Look at this another way:GDP in Japan is less than half
GDP in the U.S., but business capital stock in Japan is
roughly equal to that in the U.S.Therefore, U.S. fixed
investment is on average twice as productive as Japan’s.
Investment resources in Japan aren’t going where
they can be most productive. In too many cases good
money is going after bad.
The new generation of bank managers and corpo-
rate leaders should put the failing companies out of
their misery, and not waste the hard-earned savings
of Japanese workers. It is better to do it now, when
there is still some value to salvage, than to wait
until the desperate, bitter, bankrupt end.
There is plenty of advice out there on how to
resolve the bad loans and clean up the bank balance
sheets. Everything that can be said, has been said.
The Japanese government has the right idea creat-
ing the Financial Services Agency and strengthening
the Resolution and Collection Corporation. I am
convinced that Prime Minister Koizumi’s agenda is
the right path. Now they have to make it happen.
Just as the U.S. and other countries in the past 20
years have had to deal with painful banking crises,
and came out the better for it, Japan has to deal
with its own. I am confident it will. The time for
half-measures and postponement has passed. It has
to be done, and the quicker, the better.
The finance problems in Japan are a reflection of
problems in the real economy. Non-performing
loans are symptomatic of bad investment choices. So
even as Japan starts freeing its capital from the
prison of bad loans, the private sector has to start
identifying and moving capital into the real opportu-
nities, those where investment will enhance produc-
tivity and produce a superior return. Moving capital
and other assets out of low-return, low-productivity
industries into activities that generate higher returns
is the key to raising economic performance.
Making sure that high-growth opportunities exist,
and that firms exploit them to the fullest, is neces-
sary for any economy to achieve its full potential,
and is of special importance to Japan.
There is no question that Japanese firms respond
when the right conditions exist. Japan’s export-ori-
ented companies—Toyota, Canon, and many oth-
ers—are among the most competitive in the world.
They are constantly innovating and adjusting to the
competitive landscape in other countries, and con-
sumers, employees and shareholders worldwide
are better for it.
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“The new generation of bank
managers and corporate
leaders should put the 
failing companies out of 
their misery, and not waste
the hard-earned savings of
Japanese workers.”
Industries in which Japan’s most successful firms
operate share two characteristics. First, they can-
not be controlled by domestic regulation—there is
no way to limit entry, set prices or enforce restric-
tive standards—because they are worldwide mar-
kets. Second, there is no way to shield firms from
competition in these industries. Faced with compe-
tition, these firms rise to their best.
Unfortunately, too much of Japanese domestic indus-
try is cocooned in a web of regulations and trade
barriers. Eliminating regulatory barriers and intro-
ducing competition throughout the Japanese econo-
my entails thousands of smaller, highly important
decisions in trade, regulatory and fiscal policies. It is
not my place or the place of the U.S. government to
lecture the Japanese government on how to pro-
ceed—these are decisions for the Japanese people.
The process is not painless. Increased price com-
petition through deregulation and structural reform
requires adjustments and some dislocation. But it
also creates opportunities, encouraging new entry by
both domestic and foreign firms, increasing employ-
ment and renewing economic growth.
Prime Minister Koizumi has acknowledged that
structural reform “with  no sacred cows” is neces-
sary for economic recovery and strong, sustained
growth. He deserves our support.Another revolu-
tion that Prime Minister Koizumi can take much
credit for is emphasizing the role of private activity
in producing growth, and de-emphasizing public
expenditure as life support for the economy.
The prime minister has already outlined steps to
cut back inefficient public works expenditures and
to abolish or privatize Japan’s public corporations.
He has also made it clear that Japan will need to
reduce its budget deficit substantially in order to
stabilize Japan’s spiraling public debt.The Council on
Economic and Fiscal Policy has begun this process,
and I hope that budget planning and implementa-
tion will carry it through.
The adjustments required by cutting deficits can also
be eased by assuring that fiscal choices provide the
maximum benefits to private activity. Cutting taxes,
particularly those that discourage private activity
and investment, coupled with reducing expenditures,
can generate higher growth and fiscal balance.
I have referred a number of times to the impor-
tance of international competition. International
trade provides an environment where firms can
compete with the best and rise to their best. But
trade among nations also flourishes because we
have agreed on governing rules for actions and
responses.An agreed-upon dispute settlement sys-
tem is critical to maintaining a trade-friendly envi-
ronment. Unilateral trade actions outside the WTO
dispute settlement procedures set a bad precedent
for the world trading system.
The U.S. spent nine months conducting and review-
ing a safeguard investigation on steel, in accord with
international trade rules. Any nation that has a
complaint with this action should use the agreed
WTO dispute resolution process to seek redress.
Earlier, I described the vast difference between Japan’s
economic potential, and the recent course it has
taken. In 1991, Japan’s economy was nearly nine times
the size of China’s, and three-fifths the size of the U.S.
But if the trends of the past decade continue for Japan
and the U.S., and if China grows at the 7 percent
annual rate most analysts project, in 25 years the Japa-
nese economy will be less than one-fourth the size of
the U.S., and only four-fifths the size of China.
If that day comes, our successors won’t even debate
these topics. Japan will no longer be an engine for
the world economy, it will be a boxcar.That scenario
should not happen. Japan has to rejoin us, at full
speed, as a leader in the global economy. If Japan
grows by 3 percent annually over the next 25 years,
in 2027 Japan’s economy will be about 40 percent of
the size of the U.S., and 33 percent larger than
China’s. This should be the target. The leading
economies in the world need to grow at their full
potential, for the benefit of their own people and,
more broadly, for the benefit of people everywhere.
The people of Japan have the capacity to make their
own future and return to growth. Not by fleeing
from the competitive world economy, but by embra-
cing it and showing their true potential, as they
have before. I believe they will, not only because I
am an optimist about Japan, but because the stakes
are too great to fail.
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Q: Give us your thoughts on both Japan and the U.S. in
terms of improving corporate governance and in terms of
improving accounting systems.
O’NEILL: I believe, as the president has said, that we should
hold CEOs to the highest possible standard. My street talk
way of saying this is people who get the big bucks should
get the big responsibility with it. Now, let me divide what 
I mean by responsibility. I believe it’s a responsibility of
CEOs to know everything that’s material about the place
that they’re responsible for and to share everything that
they know in an understandable way with the people that
they’re responsible to, and I would say that his sharehold-
ers for sure, debt holders, suppliers, customers and very
importantly, employees.All of those bodies should have
everything that the CEO knows and the CEO should 
be responsible for knowing everything that’s important.
Now, CEOs should not be responsible for being right all
the time because that’s not possible. So, it’s okay to go
ahead and make dumb business decisions and the system
will deal with you for that, but it’s not okay to not know.
To not know that your enterprise has a $1 billion off-
balance sheet transaction and to back those transactions 
with stock at a pegged price which may never occur, and
for you not to know that it is a failure of commission 
not to know.And it’s a tremendous failure of omission 
to know and not share it.Those who would be guilty of
either one of those things by me are not worthy of being
CEOs.We’ve got to be a lot sharper and clearer about
what we mean by accountability and responsibility for 
people who are supposed to be leaders and those who
abuse our trust, if they do it in a criminal way, they ought
to go to jail, period.
Now, to the question of do we apparently need to tighten
up the standards some? Let me say rules instead of stan-
dards.Apparently it isn’t obvious to every CEO that off-
balance sheet transactions of any magnitude need to be
shared, so we need to tell them all I guess. I can’t imagine
people who have good will and intent don’t know that
already, but apparently we’ve got to write it down for
them. So, we ought to do that. But I also think every 
quarter the CEO should certify,“this is everything you
need to know, here it is, you can understand it.” Then we
ought to raise a new standard for audit firms.The presi-
dent has also said this.We should say to the audit firms
you’ve got to attest that the CEO told you everything and
you asked for everything, you were denied nothing, and on
the basis of that profound knowledge what he or she said
is true. Not that they did it according to some cookbook
called a generally accepted accounting principle, but you’re
attesting to the veracity and the integrity of the CEO that
he knows what he’s doing, he told you all about it.Then 
we have to do one other thing.We ought to say to the
accounting firms every quarter you’ve got to give a grade
to the firms that you’re auditing one by one that tells that
firm how their practices compare to the benchmark of 
the best that you do business with on a scale of A to F.
First of all, you would find there are not many A’s.There
would be lots of C’s and that would be an inducement to
work toward being an A for the companies.There would
be some F’s and that would be an inducement for the
accounting firms to resign the accounts.Think to your-
self: when was the last time you can remember that an
accounting firm, an auditing firm resigned an account
because they couldn’t go along with what the manage-
ment wanted? I don’t know of any.That’s instructive.
Q: Before there is a significant crisis, how much time do
you think Japan has left to act?
O’NEILL: Well, one of my great fears is that the answer 
to your question is a long time. I really have a passion
about the potential in Japan and the highest regard for 
the people that I know in Japan, and it’s a fate that I think
we should urge not happen because it’s so important for
Japan and for the rest of the world that it this kind of 
lingering sickness not go on. If you look at the physical
activity in Tokyo and you see the bustle and hustle and 
the rest that’s a familiar physical appearance of Japan, and
people are obviously not in the streets banging their 
cookware about how things have gone to hell—in some
senses what’s happening in Japan is like the fable about if
you have boiling water and you throw a frog into it, it 
will jump out immediately, but if you put it in cold water
and turn the gas on underneath, the frog gets boiled
because it gets used to the temperature so gradually it
doesn’t realize it’s dying. I think that’s what’s greatly to 
be resisted in the case of Japan because it could go on.
But again, I must say to you, I have a lot of respect for 
the traditions of Japan and for the consensus building 
decision-making process.
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